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Abstract—This paper proposes SilentDelivery, a secure, scalable
and cost-efficient protocol for implementing timed-delivery of
private information in a decentralized blockchain network.
SilentDelivery employs a novel combination of threshold secret
sharing and decentralized smart contracts. The protocol
maintains shares of the decryption key of the private information
of an information sender using a group of trustees recruited
in a blockchain network before the specified future time-frame
and restores the information to the information recipient at
the required time-frame. To tackle the key challenges that
limit the security and scalability of the protocol, SilentDelivery
incorporates two novel countermeasure strategies. The first
strategy, namely silent recruitment, enables a trustee to get
recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge of any third
party. The second strategy, namely dual-mode execution, makes
the protocol run in a lightweight mode by default, where the cost
of running smart contracts is reduced from O(n) to O(1). We
implement the protocol over the Ethereum official test network.
The results demonstrate that SilentDelivery is more secure and
scalable compared to the state of the art and reduces the cost of
running smart contracts by 85%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advancements in Internet technology has led to
a proliferation of information exchange happening in the
cyberspace. Timed information delivery service (TIDS) refers
to a class of service that enables an information sender to make
a piece of private information arrive at an information recipient
during a chosen future time-frame. Many scenarios require
timed delivery of information in real-world. For example,
courier services allow clients to select a predetermined
time-frame during which their mail can be delivered. 1
The ability of TIDS to control the arrival time of sensitive
information and knowing precisely when information arrives
can be crucial for many businesses and enterprises2. Imagine
a situation in which Alice would like her business proposal to
arrive at the corporate headquarter exactly during the board
meeting time. Here, an early arrival of the proposal could
potentially leak her idea to her competitors while a late arrival
will remove Alice’s proposal out of the competition. While
1E.g., UPS customers can pick a 2-hour time frame for ensuring a confirmed delivery.
https://www.ups.com/us/en/help-center/sri/ups-my-choice-delivery-window.page
2 https://www.rapidparcel.com/timed-delivery/
there are numerous services (e.g., Boomerang3 and Postfity4)
that provide pre-scheduled timed delivery of information,
current implementations of timed information delivery services
(TIDS) are heavily centralized. These services require the
users to entirely trust the centralized servers and their security
properties are solely limited to a single point of trust. More
importantly, even in scenarios when the service providers
are considered trustworthy, the services are still prone to
unpredictable security breaches or insider attacks that are
beyond the control of the service providers [1], [2]. On the
other hand, the emergence of Blockchain technologies such
as Ethereum[3] and Smart contracts[4] provides significant
potential for new security designs that support a decentralized
implementation of TIDS to overcome the single point of trust
issues associated with centralized approaches.
In this paper, we present SilentDelivery, a secure, scalable
and cost-efficient protocol for implementing timed-delivery
of private information in a decentralized blockchain network.
SilentDelivery employs a novel combination of threshold
secret sharing [5] and decentralized smart contracts [4].
The protocol maintains shares of the decryption key of the
private information of an information sender using a group
of trustees recruited in a blockchain network before the
specified future time-frame and restores the information to
the information recipient at the required time-frame. Here,
the use of smart contracts leads to two key challenges that
impact the security and scalability of the protocol. First, for
the sake of fair trade, the protocol requires senders and trustees
to conclude recruitment relationships via smart contracts but
the transparency of smart contracts makes it difficult to
conceal the relationships before the future time-frame which
challenges the service security in multiple aspects. Second,
due to the use of threshold secret sharing, the protocol
requires senders to recruit a large number of trustees to
gain higher service availability which involves O(n) cost for
carrying out the interactions between the n recruited trustees
and smart contracts. SilentDelivery incorporates two novel
3 Boomerang (https://www.boomeranggmail.com/) allows users of Gmail to schedule
their emails to be sent when users have no connection with the Internet.
4 Postfity (https://postfity.com/) helps users schedule messages to be posted onto social
networks at a predetermined time frame.
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countermeasure strategies to tackle these challenges. The first
strategy, namely silent recruitment, enables a trustee to get
recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge of any
third party while still making it possible for the recruitment
relationship to be revealed to the smart contracts during a
future time-frame. The second strategy, namely dual-mode
execution, makes the protocol run in a lightweight mode
by default, where the non-scalable regulations are cut off
to reduce the cost of running smart contracts from O(n) to
O(1). When a dispute occurs, any recruited trustee reserves
the ability to switch the protocol to a heavyweight mode
by rebinding the removed regulations with smart contracts to
redress and penalize any fraudulent or dishonest behavior, just
as if these regulations were never decoupled. We implement
the protocol over the Ethereum official test network. The
results demonstrate that SilentDelivery is more secure and
scalable compared to the state of the art and reduces the cost of
running smart contracts by 85%. To the best of our knowledge,
SilentDelivery is the first practical decentralized approach
designed for TIDS that is secure, scalable and cost-efficient.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the preliminaries about smart
contracts and introduce the key cryptographic tools used in
our work. While we discuss smart contracts in the context of
Ethereum [4], we note that our solutions are also applicable
to a wide range of other smart contract platforms.
A. Smart contracts
A smart contract (or contract) in Ethereum is a piece
of program created using a high-level contract-oriented
programming language such as Solidity5. After compiling
into a low-level bytecode language called Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) code, the created contract is packaged into a
transaction, which is then broadcasted to the entire Ethereum
network formed by tens of thousands of miner nodes.
Following the Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocol [6],
all the miners in Ethereum competitively solve a blockchain
puzzle and the winner packages the received transactions into
a block and appends the new block to the end of Ethereum
blockchain. From then on, it is hard to tamper with the
contract as each miner maintains a copy of the new block
and an adversary has to falsify majority of these copies in
order to change the network consensus about the contract.
In Ethereum, any user can create a transaction to call any
accessible function within a deployed contract. The function
called by this transaction is then executed and verified by
the miners and its inputs and outputs are both recorded
in Ethereum blockchain. In other words, smart contracts in
Ethereum are executed transparently in a decentralized manner
and the results are deterministic.
In order to either deploy a new contract or call a deployed
contract in Ethereum, one needs to spend Gas. Based on
the complexity of the contract or that of the called function,
5 https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
a part of Ether6 needs to be spent in order to purchase
an amount of Gas, which is then paid to the miner that
creates the new block. The Gas system is important for
Ethereum as it helps incentivize miners to stay honest, nullify
denial-of-service attacks and encourage efficiency in smart
contract programming. On the other hand, the Gas system
requires protocols, especially the multi-party ones, to be
designed with higher scalability in Ethereum. This is due to
the fact that even a single-round multi-party protocol could
spend a lot of money to run in case of a large number of
participants.
B. Cryptographic tools
The design of SilentDelivery employs several key
cryptographic tools: (1) (t,n)-threshold secret sharing [5] is
used to split the decryption key of the private information
into n shares, among which any t shares could recover the
key but t − 1 or fewer shares fail to do that. Specifically,
we denote the key split and key restoration as shares ←
SS.split(key, [t, n]) and key ← SS.restore(shares, [t, n]),
respectively. (2) we use the Keccak 256-bit hash function
supported by Ethereum and it is denoted as hash(∗). (3)
we use the ECDSA signature supported by Ethereum. In
Ethereum, each account is controlled by a pair of keys.
An account is uniquely identified through a 20-byte address
derived from its public key and can sign messages with its
private key via vrs ← ecsign(hash(message)). Later, any
other account or smart contract can recover the address of
the message signer (i.e. addr(signer)) via addr(signer) ←
ecrecover(hash(message), vrs).
III. A STRAWMAN PROTOCOL
We first describe the timed information delivery service
(TIDS) as a three-phase process. We then propose a strawman
protocol that implements TIDS using threshold secret sharing
and smart contracts. We finally analyze the key limitations of
the strawman protocol in terms of its security and scalability.
A. TIDS as a three-phase process
We describe the TIDS problem as a three-phase process:
• TIDS.send: The information sender (or sender, S) sends her
private information with a time-frame and the identity of
information recipient (or recipient, R) to the TIDS provider.
• TIDS.pend: The TIDS provider preserves the private
information before the specified time-frame.
• TIDS.deliver: The TIDS provider delivers the private
information to the recipient during the specified time-frame.
B. The strawman protocol
We first propose a strawman protocol that implements
TIDS using threshold secret sharing and smart contracts.
We sketch the strawman protocol in Fig. 1 and present the
formal description in Fig. 2. Specifically, the regulations of
the strawman protocol are programmed as an agent contract
Cagent, through which a sender can recruit a group of
6 The native cryptocurrency in Ethereum, denoted by Ξ.
Fig. 1: Strawman protocol sketch. Solid lines denote calling
smart contracts. Dashed lines denote private communication.
Ethereum accounts to jointly take the role of the TIDS
provider. We name each account serving for TIDS a trustee, T .
The protocol demands each trustee T to register itself to the
agent contract Cagent via newTrustee(whiskey,Ξdeposit),
where whiskey is a key used to establish a private
communication channel with the trustee using the Ethereum
Whisper protocol 7. Ξdeposit represents the amount of
Ether(Ξ) that will be locked in Cagent as a security deposit.
We can understand that there is a recruitment agreement at
Cagent, which goes into effect only when it has been signed
by both a sender and a trustee, so that the registration of a
trustee in this context means that the trustee has signed on
a recruitment agreement and has promised to serve for future
senders without violating the protocol. Otherwise the Ξdeposit
will get confiscated. We next describe the three phases of the
strawman protocol in detail.
TIDS.send: Sender S first creates a key as well as a receipt,
splits key into shares via secret sharing and encrypts both her
private information (or info) and receipt with key. Sender
S then sets up a new service with Cagent via newService()
and specifies the service details including a future time-frame
[day, slot], parameters [t, n] for secret sharing and addresses
(i.e., addr(∗)) of both recipient R and a list (i.e., List(∗))
of randomly selected registered trustees. In addition, sender S
also commits the values of shares and receipt by submitting
their hash values (i.e., hash(∗)) to Cagent and locks an amount
of Ether as Ξremuneration to pay the trustees. Finally,
through private channels, sender S assigns each recruited
trustee a share and transmits the encrypted [info, receipt]
to recipient R. Here, the submission of addresses of selected
trustees implies that sender S has signed the recruitment
agreements with these trustees and has promised to pay
Ξremuneration for a successful service. From then on, the
agreements signed by both sides come into force.
TIDS.pend: If any recruited trustee discloses its maintained
share before the time-frame, any trustee obtaining this share
will be able to report the premature disclosure of this share
to Cagent via reportPremature(). With hash(share) stored
7 https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Whisper
TIDS.send:
1 Sender S creates a 256-bit secret key as well as a 256-bit
secret receipt and obtains shares← SS.split(key, [t, n]).
2. Sender S ⇒ Cagent: newService([day, slot], [t, n],
addr(R), List[addr(T ), hash(share)], hash(receipt),
Ξremuneration).
3 Sender S ↪→ each trustee T : share.
4 Sender S ↪→ recipient R: E(key, [info, receipt]).
TIDS.pend:
5. Any trustee ⇒ Cagent.reportPremature(share).
TIDS.deliver:
6. Each trustee T ⇒ Cagent.revealShare(share).
7 Recipient R restores key ← SS.restore(shares, [t, n]) and
obtains [info, receipt]← D(key, [info, receipt]).
8. Recipient R⇒ Cagent.revealReceipt(receipt).
9. (Optional) Each trustee T ⇒ Cagent.withdraw().
Fig. 2: The strawman protocol. The symbol⇒ denotes calling
a function of a smart contract. The symbol ↪→ denotes
transmitting data through a private channel. A step with a gray
bullet (e.g., 1 ) refers to an off-chain action not recorded by
blockchain while a step with a white bullet (e.g., 2) refers to
an on-chain action recorded by blockchain.
in Cagent, this function will be able to verify this report and
divide Ξdeposit of the accused trustee to the informer as well
as sender S in case of a true report.
TIDS.deliver: During the time-frame, each trustee reveals its
maintained share to Cagent via revealShare(). Recipient R,
after restoring key and decrypts [info, receipt], receives info
and notifies the arrival of info by revealing receipt to Cagent
via revealReceipt(). Finally, each honest recruited trustee
can either keep serving for future senders without requesting
withdrawals or stop working and withdraw Ξdeposit and
accumulated Ξremuneration from Cagent.
C. Limitations and challenges
We identify two challenges that significantly limit the
security and scalability of the strawman protocol:
(1) Premature revelation of recruitment relationships: In the
strawman protocol, a recruitment agreement (or agreement)
is first signed by a registered trustee and then signed by
a sender. The agreement comes into force at step 2 while
at the same moment the included recruitment relationship
(or relationship) is made known to all via the uploaded
addresses of recruited trustees, namely List(addr(T )). Later,
the protocol ends at step 9, allowing each honest recruited
trustee to make withdrawals. After revisiting this procedure,
we observe that the relationships were getting revealed much
earlier than necessary. Specifically, the relationships were
made public at step 2 while only at step 9, namely the
settlement stage, it becomes necessary for Cagent to know
List(addr(T )) to approve withdrawals. Such a premature
revelation of relationships endangers the security of TIDS in
two aspects. First, it has been widely recognized that the
anonymity offered by blockchain networks is not strong [7]
and therefore, premature revelation helps an adversary locate
recruited trustees before TIDS.deliver. Specifically, for the
sake of anonymity, one may create a new Ethereum account
to be a trustee. However, this new account must have been
transferred an amount of Ether by an existing account in order
to call newTrustee() and pay Ξdeposit. In case that the
information of the owner of the existing account has been
disclosed at public places such as a forum, the anonymity of
the trustee account has been breached via the connection of the
two accounts. An adversary could then leverage the disclosed
information about the existing account to attack the new trustee
account. This significantly weakens the underlying protections
of the trustees offered by the large-scale anonymous Ethereum
P2P network. In an ideal scenario when no information about
the relationships is disclosed, from the view of an adversary,
all the registered trustees have equal probability to be recruited
by a sender, which maximizes the difficulty and cost of
attacking recruited trustees. Second, in case of a recruited
trustee seeking collusion with any other party, the premature
revelation helps the trustee prove its relationship to that party,
which further promotes the success of the trading between
these mutually distrusted two parties. What makes the problem
more challenging is that the relationships may get revealed
through side information, other than just List(addr(T )). For
instance, even if we conceal List(addr(T )) in step 2, due
to the public List(hash(share)), a trustee can still prove
its relationship by revealing its maintained share. To make
matters worse, even if the strawman protocol has forbidden any
premature disclosure of shares through reportPremature(),
it is still possible for a sophisticated trustee to bypass this
restriction by offering a zero-knowledge proof pi [8] to
demonstrate that the trustee knows the pre-image of h(share)
(i.e., share), without revealing share, thus being able to
prove its relationship without being panelized. Therefore, to
overcome this difficulty, we need a solution that can conceal
both List(addr(T )) and all possible side information (e.g.,
List(hash(share))) before TIDS.deliver while still making
List(addr(T )) get back in Cagent during TIDS.deliver to help
Cagent process withdrawal requests.
(2) A tradeoff between scalability and availability of TIDS: We
observe that the non-scalable design of the strawman protocol
leads to O(n) gas cost for a sender to recruit n trustee, which
makes the protocol hard to scale in practice. There are two
places in the strawman protocol that make the gas cost go with
O(n). First, at step 2, after sender S uploads List(addr(T )),
an amount of gas needs to be spent in Cagent to change the
state of each recruited trustee and bind this trustee with this
service. Second, at step 6, each recruited trustee needs to spend
an amount of gas to reveal its maintained share to Cagent
so that the share can be verified through the hash(share)
in Cagent and made known to recipient R. Obviously, the
simplest way of reducing gas cost would be recruiting fewer
trustees. However, given a fixed t regarding (t, n)-threshold
secret sharing as well as a fixed probability that a single
share gets lost, a larger n results in a higher probability of
recovering key at protocol step 7, namely higher availability
of TIDS [9]. This shows the tradeoff between scalability and
availability of the TIDS. To address this, we propose a redesign
of the protocol so that the non-scalable regulations within
Cagent can be removed while the removed regulations can
still constrain the behaviors of protocol participants just as if
these regulations are still bounded with Cagent in blockchain.
IV. THE SilentDelivery PROTOCOL
In this section, we start by introducing our key ideas
for tackling the challenges that limit the strawman protocol.
We then present the proposed SilentDelivery protocol and
focus on its two novel countermeasure strategies, namely
silent recruitment and dual-mode execution. We sketch the
SilentDelivery protocol in Fig. 3 and formally describe it in
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
A. Tackling the challenges
We observe both similarities and differences in tackling
the two challenges presented in Section III-C. Regarding
similarities, both the two challenges demand a way for
removing data from the agent contract Cagent while they
also need the removal to get rolled back when a certain
condition is reached. Specifically, a solution for the first
challenge, namely the premature revelation of recruitment
relationships, should remove recruitment relationships from
Cagent before TIDS.deliver and later reveal the relationships
to Cagent during TIDS.deliver. Similarly, a solution for the
second challenge, namely the tradeoff between scalability and
availability of TIDS, should remove non-scalable regulations
from Cagent and later reveal these regulations to Cagent in
case of any violation of them occurred. The main differences
between them are twofold: (1) the removed relationships
should be concealed against any third party while the removed
regulations should still be made public; (2) the rollback of the
removal of relationships is inevitably driven by the arrival of
time-frame while the rollback of the removal of regulations is
driven by violations of these regulations, which is completely
avoidable when the recruited trustees are honest.
By keeping these similarities and differences in mind,
in SilentDelivery, we design two different countermeasure
strategies for tackling the two challenges. As illustrated in
Fig. 3, the first countermeasure strategy is implemented as a
silent recruitment component within the TIDS.send phase. The
key idea behind it is to consider the relationships also a type
of private information that demands timed delivery, so both
senders and trustees should sign their recruitment agreements
secretly and their signatures should also be protected with
the key split into shares. The second countermeasure
strategy, namely dual-mode execution, allows the protocol
to be executed in two different modes. Specifically, we cut
the non-scalable regulations out of Cagent and re-organize
them as a supplementary contract Csup. By default, when
recruited trustees honestly follow the removed regulations, the
protocol goes with its lightweight mode without involving any
O(n) on-chain interactions. If any recruited trustee violates
the removed regulations, any honest trustee can rebind the
removed regulations (i.e., Csup) with Cagent to penalize the
Fig. 3: SilentDelivery protocol sketch
violations, which turns the protocol into the heavyweight mode
and results in a pay-cut. Thus, the penalty of misbehaviors and
the pay-cut induced by the heavyweight mode can incentivize
recruited trustees to stay honest, making the protocol stays at
its lightweight mode with O(1) gas cost.
B. Silent recruitment
Before presenting the TIDS.send phase, it is worth noting
that SilentDilivery demands each trustee to create a list of
[privkey, pubkey] key pairs for a list of future time-frames
[day, slot], maintain all the privkeys by itself and submit all
the pubkeys to the agent contract Cagent during registration
via newTrustee(). During TIDS.send, sender S first deploys
a switch contract Csw, which contains a single function
deploySupplementary(). Just like the name implies, through
Csw, any honest trustee can deploy the supplementary contract
Csup and turn the protocol from the default lightweight
mode into the heavyweight mode. Since the only transaction
that is allowed to be sent by Csw creates Csup, the
address of Csup is deterministic and can be computed by
sender S at protocol step 1. After that, sender S sets
up a service with Cagent without disclosing any (side)
information revealing recruitment relationships, thus achieving
the first design goal presented in Section ??. From then
on, silent recruitment is executed via private channels in
the form of a three-way handshake. Specifically, sender
S initials the handshake by giving each trustee the two
contracts Csw and Csup, a signature vrssup regarding the
two contracts and an index assigned to the trustee. Upon
getting contacted, each trustee verifies the correctness of
service information and sends back a signature vrst ←
ecsign(hash(addr(Csw), index)) to sender, which implies
1. Sender S deploys a switch contract Csw and obtains both
addr(Csw) and addr(Csup).
2. Sender S ⇒ Cagent.newService([day, slot], [l, t, n],
addr(Csw), addr(Csup), addr(R), hash(receipt)).
Silent recruitment
Sender [initial]:
3 ↪→ T : index, addr(Csw), Csup, vrssup ← ecsign(
hash(addr(Csw), Csup).
Trustee [first signature]:
4 Verify service information with Cagent and Csup.
5 ↪→ S: vrst ← ecsign(hash(addr(Csw), index)).
Sender [second signature]:
6 vrss ← ecsign(hash(addr(Csw), index, vrst)).
7 Create a 256-bit secret key as well as a 256-bit secret receipt
and obtains shares← SS.split(key, (t, n)).
8 Encrypt shares to onions with public keys of selected
trustees: onions← E(pubkeys, shares).
9 ↪→ each T : List(E(key, [index, vrss, vrsd])), onions.
10 Sender S ↪→ R: E(key, [info, receipt]), onions.
Fig. 4: TIDS.send in SilentDelivery
that the trustee has agreed to take charge of this service.
Upon receiving trustee’s signature, sender S also generates
a signature vrss ← ecsign(hash(addr(Csw), index, vrst)),
which says that sender S has agreed to recruit the signer of
vrst in this service. Then, similar to the strawman protocol,
sender S creates shares of a key and a receipt. However,
unlike the strawman protocol, these shares are not directly
given to trustees. Instead, at protocol step 8, each share is
iteratively encrypted with l pubkeys from l different recruited
trustees, where l is a parameter determined by sender S at
protocol step 2. In this way, each share is turned into an onion
and its recovery needs privkeys maintained by l trustees.
This design allows the premature disclosure of a share to
be verified through pairing the disclosed privkeys with the
pubkeys in Cagent, instead of having to rely on hash(share)
that reveals recruitment relationships. Finally, through private
channels, sender S makes all these onions public, transmit
a list of encrypted tuple [index, vrss, vrsd] to each recruited
trustee and encrypted [info, receipt] to the recipient.
C. Dual-mode execution
Next, we present the dual-mode execution. By default,
SilentDilivery is executed in the lightweight mode, resulting
in O(1) gas cost by assuming all recruited trustees are
honest. In case of any misbehaviors, the protocol is switched
to the heavyweight mode, which spends gas in O(n) and
reduces remuneration received by recruited trustees. Thus
it incentivizes the trustees to stay honest to earn a higher
profit. We design the dual-mode execution to include six
epochs spreading across the TIDS.deliver phase. Specially,
we consider the TIDS.pend phase as epoch-0, during which
any trustee can switch the default lightweight mode to the
heavyweight mode by deploying Csup via Csw and report
a prematurely disclosed privkey. Then, in epoch-1, if the
recruited trustees honestly obey the non-scalable regulations
Epoch-0 [reporting premature]:
1. Upon detecting premature disclosure of privkeys, a trustee T could do the following, which makes the protocol jumps to epoch-2.
1.1. Deploy the supplementary contract Csup through the existed switch contract Csw, thus switching the protocol to the heavy
mode: ⇒ Csw.deploySupplementary(addr(Csw), Csup, vrssup).
1.2. Report the premature disclosure through ⇒ Csup.reportPremature(index, privkey).
Epoch-1 [lightweight mode]:
2 Each trustee T reveals its privkey corresponding to the [day, slot] selected by sender S.
3 Recipient R gets shares← D(privkeys, onions).
4. If |shares| >= t, recipient R does the following and the protocol jumps to epoch-6.
4.1. Restore key ← SS.restore(shares, [t, n]) and obtain [info, receipt]← D(key, [info, receipt]).
4.2. ⇒ Cagent: recipientReceipt(receipt, addr(S), addr(Csw)).
Otherwise, the protocol goes to epoch-2.
Epoch-2 [switching mode]:
5. In case that the supplementary contract Csup has not yet been deployed during epoch-0, any trustee T could deploy Csup through
the existed switch contract Csw, thus switching the protocol to the heavy mode:
⇒ Csw.deploySupplementary(addr(Csw), Csup, vrssup).
6 Trustees reveal their maintained privkeys to public and collect privkeys from others.
7. If |shares| >= t, trustees should do the following, which makes the protocol enter epoch-3.
7.1. Compute key ← SS.restore(shares, (t, n)) and List(index, vrss, vrsd)← List(D(key, [index, vrss, vrsd])).
7.2. Reveal identities of all trustees through ⇒ Csup.revealIdentity(List(index, vrss, vrsd)).
Otherwise, the protocol jumps to epoch-6.
Epoch-3 [heavyweight mode]:
8. After identities of all trustees have been revealed to Csup, each trustee T should reveal its privkey corresponding to the [day, slot]
selected by sender S through ⇒ Csup.revealPrivkey(index, privkey).
At the end of epoch-3, the protocol goes to epoch-4.
Epoch-4 [reporting absent/fake]:
9. Upon detecting an absent trustee who did not reveal its privkey during epoch-3, any trustee could report this misbehavior through
⇒ Csup.reportAbsent(index).
10. Upon detecting a trustee who revealed a fake privkey during epoch-3, any trustee could report this misbehavior through ⇒
Csup.reportFake(index).
11. After reporting any misbehavior, a trustee could transfer the record of this misbehavior from Csup to Cagent through ⇒
Csup.informAgent(index).
At the end of epoch-4, the protocol goes to epoch-5.
Epoch-5 [second revelation]:
12. Recipient submits the receipt through ⇒ Cagent.recipientReceipt(receipt, addr(S), addr(Csw)).
At the end of epoch-5, the protocol goes to epoch-6.
Epoch-6 [settlement]:
13. If the protocol is failed:
13.1. (Optional) Each trustee T could withdraw its deposit.
13.2. Sender S could withdraw remained fee anytime after epoch-5.
14. Otherwise, the service is successful:
14.1. (Optional) Each trustee T , with no misbehavior, could withdraw its deposit, remuneration or reporting award. In case that the
protocol terminates via lightweight mode, trustees need to follow step 6 and 7.1 to prove relationships to request withdrawals.
14.2. Sender S could withdraw remained fee anytime after epoch-5.
Fig. 5: TIDS.pend and TIDS.deliver in SilentDilivery. They together form the dual-mode execution.
shifted from Cagent to Csup by revealing their privkeys to
recipient R via private channels, R will be able to recover
key and acquire info and receipt, which makes the protocol
reach a successful termination and jump to epoch-6, namely
the settlement stage. In case that some trustees violate the
regulations in Csup and result in a failure of recovering key,
the protocol will enter epoch-2, during which any honest
trustee can switch the protocol into the heavyweight mode
(i.e., epoch-3) by deploying Csup via Csw. After that, the
recruited trustees reveal privkeys to all via Whisper protocol,
decrypt onions to shares, recover key from shares and
finally acquire the list of tuple [index, vrss, vrsd]. Each tuple
can prove a recruitment relationship to Csup by revealing
an agreement signed by a trustee via vrst and by a sender
via vrss. If the key can not get recovered, the protocol
researches a failed termination and jumps to epoch-6. During
epoch-3, the protocol is executed in the heavyweight mode,
demanding each recruited trustee to reveal its privkey to
Csup via revealPrivkey(). Furthermore, any absent or fake
privkey that were not appropriately submitted during epoch-3
will be identified as misbehavior and reported during epoch-4,
resulting in the dishonest trustee to lose Ξdeposit. After that,
epoch-5 provides the second chance of making the protocol
end with success, though in heavyweight mode. Finally,
during epoch-6, depending on how the protocol terminates,
the protocol participants can request withdrawals at Cagent.
Phase Step Function Gas UDS
TIDS.send 1 deploy Csw 616666 $1.812 newService 83121 $0.24
Epoch-0 1.1 deploySupplementary 2425356 $7.101.2 reportPremature 65317 $0.19
Epoch-1 4.2 recipientReceipt 54291 $0.16
Epoch-2 5 deploySupplementary 2425356 $7.107.2 revealIdentity 72678 $0.21
Epoch-3 8 revealPrivkey 90689 $0.27
Epoch-4
9 reportAbsent 65343 $0.19
10 reportFake 1280723 $3.75
11 informAgent 57042 $0.17
Epoch-5 12 recipientReceipt 54291 $0.16
TABLE I: Key functions and their cost in Gas and USD.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation and
evaluation of the proposed SilentDelivery protocol. We
programmed the protocol as smart contracts using Solidity, the
most commonly used smart contract programming language.
We also anonymously deployed the contracts to the Ethereum
official test network rinkeby8 for evaluation purpose.
In TABLE I, we list the key functions in the programmed
smart contracts that interact with protocol participants during
different phases of SilentDelivery and the cost of these
functions in both Gas and USD. The cost in USD was
computed through cost(USD) = cost(Gas)∗GasToEther ∗
EtherToUSD, where GasToEther and EtherToUSD
were taken as their mean value during the first half of the
year 2019 recorded in Etherscan 9, which are 1.67 ∗ 10−8
Ether/Gas and 175 USD/Ether, respectively. As illustrated by
the results, in the lightweight mode, the completion of a
service only requires a sender to deploy Csw ($1.81) and set
up a new service ($0.24) during TIDS.send and a recipient
to submit the receipt ($0.16) during Epoch-1, which costs
only $2.21 in total. This cost is independent of the number
of recruited trustees, namely O(1), so the tradeoff between
security and scalability is eliminated and the scalability of
TIDS gets significantly improved. In contrast, the heavyweight
mode requires a sender to deploy Csw ($1.81) and set up
service ($0.24) during TIDS.send and a trustee to deploy
Csup ($7.10) and reveal identities of all recruited trustees
during Epoch-2 ($0.21n). It then requires all recruited trustees
to reveal privkeys during Epoch-3 ($0.27n) and finally a
recipient to submit the receipt ($0.16) during Epoch-5. It thus
costs $(9.31+ 0.48n) for completing a service that recruits n
trustees. If any misbehavior occurs, the reporting functions
can be invoked during Epoch-1 and Epoch-4 and the cost
for calling these reporting functions will be deducted from
Ξdeposit paid by protocol violators.
Next, we compare the cost of SilentDelivery with that of
Kimono [10], a recent project that also employed Ethereum to
8 addr(Cagent): 0xa49d94bf3a7eeF256772b68Bf7D799Aa30F6F342
addr(Csw): 0x1640B660147fD684C37d8ccf1caAB732898c8627
addr(Csup): 0x4CBa2Ab68779d861D594A144Aa1a099a27E917e9
9 https://etherscan.io/charts
Fig. 6: Cost of Kimono and SilentDelivery
release private information to future via recruiting trustees. We
tested the cost of recruiting different numbers of trustees in the
two projects and displayed the results in Fig. 6. As can be seen,
compared with Kimono, the SilentDelivery protocol proposed
in this paper is much more scalable and cost-effective. Due to
the removal of non-scalable regulations, the lightweight mode
offers O(1) cost, which for the first time makes a decentralized
approach for timed-delivery of private information practical
and scalable. We noticed that even the heavyweight mode is
more scalable than Kimono. This is due to the use of silent
recruitment, which reduces the cost of the protocol during
TIDS.send. In summary, compared with the state of the art,
both the modes offered by SilentDelivery are more scalable.
Particularly, the lightweight mode of SilentDelivery can reduce
the cost of recruiting more than 20 trustees by over 85%.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Sending private information to a future time point
The study of timed release of private information began
with May [11]. Since then, there have been extensive studies
on this problem. One representative approach [12], [13],
[14] protects private information with a time-lock puzzle,
forcing recipients to solve a cryptographic puzzle to obtain
the information. Nevertheless, the time for solving such
puzzles is non-deterministic and as a result, the delivery
time of the information can not be precisely controlled.
Also, cryptographic approaches for timed data release come
with a very significant computational cost and as such,
these techniques are not scalable. Another well-studied
approach [15], [16], [17] relies on a (semi-)trusted time server
to release time trapdoors to recipients at specified future
time points. These techniques involve a single point of trust
and create a safety bottleneck. The recent emergence of
blockchain technology [6] and smart contracts [4] have started
the development of new decentralized approaches. One of
the decentralized approaches [18], [19], [20] encloses private
information with blockchain puzzles used in Proof-of-Work [6]
and therefore minimizes the computational burden of the
information senders as the blockchain puzzles are periodically
solved by blockchain miners. However in such an approach,
the involved heavy cryptographic primitives result in very high
performance overhead [19], [21]. Another direction of recent
decentralized techniques for timed data release [21], [22],
[10] leverages smart contracts [4] to establish a decentralized
virtual autonomous agent, through which an information
sender could recruit a group of peers from the blockchain
network as her trustees to cooperatively maintain and deliver
her private information to recipients. Here, the transparency of
smart contracts makes it difficult to conceal any information
recorded by the virtual agent and therefore challenges the
service security in multiple aspects. Besides that, the cost of
running smart contracts in this approach is proportional with
the number of recruited trustees, making it costly to recruit
more trustees to gain higher service availability. Our work in
this paper tackles the key limitations of the state-of-the-art
approaches using blockchain-based smart contracts [21], [22],
[10]. To the best of our knowledge, SilentDelivery is the first
decentralized solution for the timed data release problem with
strong guarantees on security, scalability and cost-efficiency.
B. Scaling blockchain with off-chain channels
Payment channel network (PCN) [23], [24] is a promising
technique for improving blockchain scalability, which allows
two parties to trade through off-chain channels without
having to be charged by blockchain for every payment
transaction between them. Recently, PCN was extended to
state channel network (SCN) [25] so that in addition to
payment transactions, all general transactions that interact with
smart contracts can be supported. While dual-mode execution
scheme proposed in this paper is inspired by PCN and SCN,
it further extends the objective from only reducing the cost
between the two parties to also reducing the cost of running
the protocol involving multiple participants.
C. Using cryptocurrency as security deposits
There have been many recent efforts on blockchain-based
protocol design that leverage cryptocurrency as security
deposits to penalize unexpected behaviors and improve
security. Andrychowicz et al. [26] used bitcoin to penalize
anyone who unfairly aborts a secure multiparty computation
(SMC). Kiayias et al. [27] proposed to use bitcoin as collateral
to protect digital content. In [28], the authors use Ether
as security deposits to provide verifiable cloud computing.
Matsumoto et al. [29] used Ether as security deposits to
enforce certificate authorities to be honest. Inspired by these
previous efforts, SilentDelivery demands each trustee lock
Ether in smart contracts as security deposits to penalize
potential misbehaviors violating the protocol and thereby
enforces recruited trustees to stay honest.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes SilentDelivery, the first practical
decentralized solution for cost-effectively implementing
timed-delivery of private information with strong security
and scalability guarantees. Our solution employs a novel
combination of threshold secret sharing and decentralized
smart contracts and tackles two key challenges that
significantly limit the security and scalability of the protocol.
Through silent recruitment, SilentDelivery makes a trustee
get recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge
of any third party while still making it possible for the
recruitment relationship to be revealed to the smart contracts
during a future time-frame. Through dual-mode execution,
SilentDelivery incentivizes trustees to make the protocol get
executed in the lightweight mode, reducing the service cost
from O(n) to O(1). We implement the protocol over the
Ethereum official test network. The results demonstrate that
SilentDelivery reduces the cost of running smart contracts by
over 85% and is more secure and scalable compared to the
state of the art.
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